Naval War College Review

Volume 32
Number 2 *February*

Article 33

1979

Supplying War Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton

John B. Hattendorf

that are concise, full of sound advice for a contemporary soldier, and strictly practical. Undoubtedly they were intended to be published as a guide for future leaders.

The general views Bérault expressed were not new but the unique aspect of them lies in the personal element that he added to a work on the art of warfare. As such it is substantially different, but far overshadowed by Fourquevaux' *Instructions sur le Facit de la Guerre*, the most famous and widely quoted 16th-century military work. Élie de Comminges has made a substantial contribution to the study of military writing by making Bérault's work more widely available.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Pembroke College, Oxford

van Creveld, Martin. *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 284pp.

General works on the history of logistics are few and far between, and even studies of logistics in particular campaigns are far outnumbered by tactical and strategic studies. *Supplying War* attempts to give a broad outline of the development of logistics between the Thirty Years' War and World War II. In a subsequent article ("Supplying an Army: An Historian's View," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, June 1978, pp. 56-63), van Creveld summarizes his argument and carries it on to the present day.

In approaching his subject, van Creveld asks some of the basic questions appropriate to a study of the influence of logistics on strategy: what were the logistics factors limiting an army's operations? What arrangements were made to move it and keep it supplied while moving? How did these arrangements affect the course of the campaign, both as planned and as carried out? These are extremely important questions, and the task of finding answers to them is an important and useful one. However, the title of the book misleads the reader into assuming that the author's subject is much broader than it is. It is not a book about supplying war, but a study of army logistics. The broader aspects of war logistics that must surely include some reference to national finance, the interrelationship of land, sea, and later, air forces, the structure of coalitions when they are used, the "friction" of bureaucracy, are not considered in any great extent. The subtitle defines the topic of supplying war as logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. The names of the men give us a clue that this is a book about armies, yet when we look into it, we discover that the subject covers only half of those 300 years. In fact, the book is about the period from Napoleon to Patton.

It is unfortunate that Dr. van Creveld has dismissed the 17th and 18th centuries summarily, for there would seem to be much more there for his subject than he allows. In terms of the British Army, for example, there are further points to be made about the operation of armies on distant stations. The operations of the army in Spain during the War of the Spanish Succession, across the Atlantic in the War for America, or in Spain during the Napoleonic wars offer additional perspectives. Some of these have already been studied by other scholars in terms of logistics. There is much more to be said about the Blenheim campaign of 1704, and these matters may be gleaned from the works of such German and Austrian historians as E. Ritter, Braubach and Mathis.

Van Creveld begins his study in earnest with the Ulm campaign of 1805 that he uses to illustrate an army living off the country. Then he begins to jump to a number of other campaigns in the following century and a half that illustrate other points. He uses the campaign of 1812 to show the inadequacy of

horse-drawn transport in the conditions of the Russian winter. The Franco-Prussian War is an illustration of the use of railroads and the inadequacy of transport from railheads. Nineteen hundred and fourteen is used to show the limitations on the military use of railroads. In World War II, he looks at the problem of the German Army in its eastern campaign struggling with the transition to a mechanized force, a transition that he shows was completed in the Allied forces by 1944. Finally, he looks at some of the unique aspects of Rommel's desert campaigns.

In the chapters on World War II, the author has made valuable use of his own research in German archives at Freiburg. In other chapters, he has supplemented published studies with reference to manuscripts in the Depot de Guerre, Vincennes, the Public Record Office in London, and the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, now at King's College, London.

Despite the qualifications that one must have concerning the 17th and 18th centuries in this book and the narrowly defined understanding of war logistics, Dr. van Creveld makes a very important contribution by showing to us the largely untouched subject of logistics in war history. It is a thought-provoking study that one hopes will encourage further studies and reinterpretations in the field.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Pembroke College, Oxford

Watson, Peter. *War on the Mind: the Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology*. New York: Basic Books. 534pp.

This rather hefty volume by an author who is both a clinical psychologist and an editor of the London *Sunday Times* may be just what its dust jacket proclaims, "the most comprehensive work on the psychology of warfare ever published." Peter Watson assesses his subject under five broad divisions: Combat Stress, Determinants of Loyalty and Treason, Survival, and Psychology of Counter-Insurgency. He has pursued his inquiries in eight countries and estimates that there are 146 separate institutes where the subject is being investigated, "the overwhelming majority (130) in the United States." His annotation, in the back matter, is extensive though there is no bibliography.

In a tempered, near conversational style Watson probes into the welter of experimentation in his field now ongoing across the globe (mainly non-Communist). He pinpoints the U.S. Army's psychological warfare school at Fort Bragg as "the most sophisticated institution of its kind in the world." He has interesting things to say about a variety of intriguing experiments, e.g., tactual communications, distinctions between leadership and command, assessments of the personality type liable to commit atrocities, or the manipulation potential of witchcraft and sorcery. Some of his commentary is extensive and persuasive, such as the sections on interrogation and brainwashing; some is skimpy, such as that dealing with animals as weapons.

It is in certain of his conclusions that the author may give one pause. He thinks, for example, that politicomilitary research ought "to be carried out openly, or at least to be published openly, so that it can be freely reviewed and criticized and its implications fully aired." Again: "the deliberate development of weapons of unnecessary suffering . . . is out," because ideas can be stolen and because scientists suffer from overheated imaginations anyway. Or: psywarriors come to learn so much about the makeup of a given enemy that they tend to laboratoryize him and so transform him into a "lesser human being."

But let it not be said that Watson is a fangs-bared antimilitarist. He concedes that "it has recently been shown that the military mind is *not* more ideological than the non-military mind; if any-